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Abstract 
Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance (TAI) is a welcome companion volume to his 
2009 book The Case for Contextualism (TCC). Where TCC focused on contextualism as a view in the 
philosophy of language, TAI focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and 
solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus 
of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two 
things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. 
Second, it must explain how it can seem that we don’t know these things. In slogan form, DeRose’s 
argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the 
“appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. 
In my critical discussion I will argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist semantics to account 
for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength” of the appearance of ignorance is 
unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it. 
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1. Introduction 
Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance (henceforth TAI) is a companion 
volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism (henceforth TCC). Where TCC focused 
on arguments for and against contextualism drawn from the philosophy of language, TAI 
focuses on arguments for and against contextualism drawn from epistemology, with the 
skeptical problem being the main focus in six of the seven chapters. As one would expect, there 
is a degree of overlap here; as DeRose is keen to emphasize, it is hard to keep the philosophy 
of language out of epistemology. But it is safe to say that the reader expecting a deeper degree 
of engagement with epistemological issues than in TCC will not be disappointed. Taken as a 
whole, TAI is a salutary reminder that DeRose’s contributions to 20th and 21st-century 
epistemology are hardly confined to a thesis about the meaning of the word ‘knows’. 
 I am aware of two models for writing a critical commentary on a substantial piece of 
work like TAI. The first involves highlighting some central claims without making much of an 
attempt to show how they fit together, and then subjecting each claim to individual critical 
scrutiny. The second involves reconstructing the central line of argument and then subjecting 
that argument to sustained critical scrutiny. Each model has its benefits and costs. The first 
model allows for in-depth engagement with the nitty gritty of the target work, but runs the risk 
of missing the wood for the trees. The second model focuses on the wood at the expense of the 
trees. For better or worse, this commentary will follow the second model.  
 I will start by outlining what I take to be DeRose’s central argument in TAI. In slogan 
form, DeRose’s argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed 
to account for the “appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that 
skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. I will then argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist 
semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength” of the 
appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it.  
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2. The Two Tasks for a Theory of Knowledge 
The central aim of TAI is to deal with what DeRose calls the “argument from ignorance” (AI). 
Let “O” be a proposition about the external world one would ordinarily take oneself to know 
(e.g. “I have hands”, “That is a zebra”) and “H” a suitably chosen skeptical hypothesis (e.g. “I 
am a handless brain in a vat (BIV)”, “That is a mule cleverly disguised to look like a zebra”). 
AI can be stated as follows: 
 
1. I don’t know that not-H. 
2. If I don’t know that not-H, then I don’t know that O. 
3. I don’t know that O. 
 
While DeRose ultimately wants to reject AI, he thinks that it is worth taking seriously. Here he 
is making the case for the plausibility of each premise of AI: 
 
AI does present us with a puzzle because … each of its premises is initially plausible, when 
H is well chosen. For however improbable or bizarre it may seem to suppose that I am a 
BIV, it also seems that I don’t know that I’m not one. How could I know such a thing? And 
it also seems that if, for all I know, I am a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. How 
could I know that I have hands if, for all I know, I’m bodiless (and therefore handless)? 
(p. 2)1 
 
The first premise is plausible because it seems incredible to suppose that I could know that I’m 
not a BIV. The second premise is plausible because it is backed up by the principle that 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all references are to TAI. 
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knowledge is closed under known entailment. While there are difficulties formulating this 
principle (which DeRose discusses in Chapter 5 and Appendix D), the intuitive idea is that 
competent deduction is a way of extending what we know. While DeRose doesn’t see himself 
as being overly dogmatic about closure, he does think there are serious costs involved in 
rejecting it. 
 We have something approaching (though maybe not quite) a paradox: two plausible 
premises entail a conclusion that we find incredible. While DeRose sets out to resolve this near-
paradox, not just any old resolution will do: 
 
[W]e should hope for a better treatment of the argument than simply choosing which of 
the three individually plausible propositions—the two premises and the negation of the 
conclusion—seems least certain and rejecting it on the grounds that the other two are true. 
In seeking a solution to this puzzle, we should seek an explanation of how we fell into this 
skeptical trap in the first place, and not settle for making a simple choice among three 
distasteful ways out of the trap. We must explain how two premises that together yield a 
conclusion we find so incredible can themselves seem so plausible to us. (p. 2) 
 
DeRose is therefore wary of any solution to the skeptical problem that merely consists in 
rejecting one of the two premises. Any such solution fails to explain why AI seems so plausible 
in the first place, and so doesn’t explain the appearance of ignorance. So, for DeRose, there are 
two tasks a solution to AI must accomplish. It must, first, tell us how the conclusion of AI is to 
be resisted and, second, explain the appearance of ignorance. 
 This conception of the skeptical problem puts a constraint on the appropriate 
methodology for solving it. It isn’t enough to come up with a theory of knowledge, motivate it 
via non-skeptical considerations such as fit with intuitions about ordinary cases of knowledge, 
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then apply it to AI, yielding the result that one of the premises is to be rejected. This would 
complete the first task of telling us how the conclusion of AI is to be resisted, but it wouldn’t 
even begin on the second task of explaining why both premises—including the one to be 
rejected—seem so plausible.2 
 
3. DeRose’s “Picture” of Knowledge 
In this section, I will outline how I take DeRose to think the first task should be carried out. It 
will be helpful to work with this concrete instance of AI, which I’ll call BIV: 
 
1. I don’t know that I’m not a handless BIV. 
2. If I don’t know that I’m not a handless BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. 
3. I don’t know that I have hands. 
 
One way of resisting the skeptical conclusion of BIV would be to develop a theory of 
knowledge on which one of the premises is false. On this approach, the aim would be to come 
up with necessary and sufficient conditions on knowledge (or at least approximations to such 
conditions) according to which I do know that I have hands. But this way of going has the 
drawback that most (or all) candidate sets of necessary and sufficient conditions seem subject 
to counter-example. DeRose’s response to this is to invoke a distinction between “theories” 
and “pictures”. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke doesn’t see himself as defending a new theory 
                                                 
2 DeRose might be read as proposing a stronger constraint to the effect that any solution to the skeptical 
problem must be motivated by reflection on the problem itself, rather than imposed on the problem 
“from outside”. Consider, for instance, his discussion of Nozick’s (1981) theory-driven denial of the 
second premise on (pp. 202–203). Whether this is his intention or not, I don’t find this stronger 
constraint compelling, and it is hard to see why the initial plausibility of AI would support it. 
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of reference but rather as presenting a new picture of reference. The problem with theories is 
that, as Kripke tells us, they tend to be false. The nice thing about pictures is that they are more 
malleable. Following Kripke, DeRose sees the epistemologist as in the business of presenting 
pictures of knowledge. This picture does not pretend to offer necessary or sufficient conditions 
on knowledge, or to be free of counter-examples. 
 Let’s start with how we can know common-or-garden propositions. DeRose’s account 
here is a variant on a standard safety account. On the standard safety account, put roughly, one 
knows some proposition p only if one’s belief that p is safe, where one’s belief that p is safe if 
and only if it could not easily have been false. DeRose favours what he calls a “double safety” 
account, on which one knows that p only if one’s belief as to whether or not p is the case is 
“doubly safe”, where one’s belief that p is doubly safe if and only if one’s belief as to whether 
p could not easily have been false (p. 211). To see the difference, it is helpful to put both 
conditions in terms of possible worlds: 
 
SAFETY: One’s belief that p is safe iff there are no nearby possible worlds in which one 
believes that p but p is false. 
 
DOUBLE SAFETY: One’s belief that p is doubly safe iff there are no nearby possible 
worlds in which one’s belief as to whether or not p is the case fails to match the fact of the 
matter. 
 
Imagine that, for whatever reason, Catriona is very prone to abandoning her belief that she has 
hands when she takes drugs, and she takes drugs all the time. But she has no tendency to falsely 
believe that she has hands. Catriona’s belief is safe, because there are no nearby worlds in 
which she believes that she has hands even though she doesn’t. But her belief isn’t doubly safe, 
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because there are plenty of nearby worlds in which she has hands yet doesn’t believe that she 
does (worlds in which she took drugs). So DeRose’s double safety account would say Catriona 
doesn’t know that she has hands, even though her belief is safe.  
 As is familiar, the safety condition is the basis of a simple account of how it is that we 
can know common-or-garden propositions. Take the common-or-garden proposition “I have a 
hand.”, There are no nearby possible worlds in which I believe that I have a hand yet my belief 
is false. So my belief is safe. DeRose’s double safety account can offer a very similar account 
of how it is that we can know common-or-garden propositions, with the slight difference that 
it will rule that people like Catriona don’t know that they have hands. Setting aside this minor 
difference, DeRose’s account of how we can know common-or-garden propositions is identical 
with the standard safety account.3 
 As is also familiar, one can extend this account to explain how we can know the denials 
of skeptical hypotheses (Sosa 1999). Our beliefs that we’re not BIVs are safe: there are no 
nearby worlds in which we believe that we’re not BIVs yet this belief is false, for the simple 
reason that there are (we assume) no nearby worlds in which we’re BIVs. Our beliefs that we’re 
not BIVs are also generally doubly safe.4 One might think this gives DeRose what he wants; 
we can (and do!) know the denials of skeptical hypotheses. But DeRose is unwilling to simply 
extend his double safety account in this way. As I understand him, the basic reason is that our 
beliefs that we’re not BIVs are vacuously safe, and so this sort of account sheds no light on 
                                                 
3 Well, it isn’t quite identical, given that DeRose is a contextualist. Everything I say here about what 
we can know on DeRose’s account should be understood as indexed to the sorts of ordinary epistemic 
standards that many of our beliefs meet. 
4 There will be people, like Catriona, whose belief that they are not BIVs will be safe but not doubly 
safe, but Catriona is very unusual. 
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how it is that we can know that we’re not BIVs (see especially pp. 220–222).5 These beliefs 
are vacuously safe precisely because there simply are no nearby worlds in which we are BIVs.6  
 This leads DeRose to develop a more complex account of how we can know that we’re 
not BIVs. This account holds that, in order to know that one is not a BIV, one must: 
 
i. Truly believe that one is not a BIV; and 
ii. Doubly safely believe that one is not a BIV; and 
iii. Have no good reason to think that one is a BIV. 
 
DeRose bases (iii) on a defense of a form of epistemic conservatism: the epistemic conservative 
thinks (put roughly) that, absent good reason to think that things are otherwise to how they 
seem, one is justified in believing what seems to one to be the case.7 While one could endorse 
epistemic conservatism across the board, DeRose seems to want to restrict it to whatever 
“seemings” are relevant to our belief that we’re not BIVs (p. 229). So his view is that, absent 
good reason to think that we’re not BIVs, we are justified in believing that we’re not. In order 
to turn this into knowledge, our beliefs that we’re not BIVs have to also be (i) true and (ii) 
                                                 
5 It strikes me that DeRose is assuming that the two tasks for a theory of knowledge are a little more 
onerous than stated in Section 2. A theory of knowledge must not only tell us which premise of AI is to 
be resisted, it must also do so on the basis of a genuinely explanatory account of what knowledge is. 
The problem DeRose sees with a standard safety account of how we know that we’re not BIVs is that 
it offers no explanation at all, because the safety condition is vacuously true in this case.  
6 While DeRose is clearly displaying internalist sympathies here, it is important to note that he defends 
these sympathies rather than simply assuming them. 
7 For defenses of such views see, Huemer (2007) and the essays collected in Tucker (2013).  
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doubly safe. Because we can assume they are true, and if they are true they are going to be 
doubly safe, we can know that we’re not BIVs. DeRose’s account of how we can know that 
we’re not BIVs is therefore a hybrid of the standard safety account and an epistemic 
conservative account. This raises several questions. In particular, why are there two different 
conditions on knowledge (at least, knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses)? While 
DeRose surely has multiple ways at his disposal of explaining how such a seemingly 
disjunctive account of knowledge has some sort of underlying unity, I won’t pursue this issue 
here.8 
 So far, we just have a substantive picture of knowledge with clear potential to disarm 
the skeptical problem. But where’s the contextualism? 
 
4. DeRose’s Contextualist Semantics 
As I read him, DeRose’s substantive picture of knowledge is primarily intended to carry out 
the first task for a theory of knowledge. It serves to explain how it is that we can know the 
denials of skeptical hypotheses, and so how the conclusion of AI can be resisted. His 
contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is primarily intended to carry out the second 
task. It serves to explain how it can seem like we don’t know much if anything, and so why AI 
can seem so plausible. So the task for contextualism is to explain the appearance of ignorance. 
                                                 
8 While some might think the way to go is to distinguish between “internalist” and “externalist” forms 
of justification, and hold that knowledge (at least of the denials of skeptical hypotheses) requires both 
forms, I think a better way to go would be to embed this within Sosa’s (2009, 2007) animal/reflective 
knowledge distinction. Animal knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses requires simple safety, 
whereas reflective knowledge requires that one has no good reason to think one is a BIV. For discussion 
and defense of the epistemological value of Sosa’s distinction see, Carter and McKenna (forthcoming). 
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 We can start with the basic idea behind contextualism and contextualist solutions to the 
skeptical problem. The contextualist holds that the word ‘knows’ is context-sensitive; it can 
mean different things in different contexts. In one context (a context governed by ordinary 
standards), to say “I know that I have hands” might mean that I know by ordinary standards 
that I have hands. In another context (a context governed by very high standards), to say “I 
know that I have hands” might mean that I know by very high standards that I have hands. 
Because I may know by ordinary standards but not by very high standards, both of these 
utterances might be true. The contextualist also holds that, while the word ‘knows’ is context-
sensitive, ordinary speakers are often ignorant of this fact (in much the same way that ordinary 
speakers are often ignorant of the fact that words like ‘flat’ and ‘empty’ are context-sensitive).9 
 This yields the basic contextualist solution to BIV. The contextualist says that, in some 
contexts—contexts governed by very high standards—the first premise is true. Because the 
second premise—“If I don’t know that I’m not a handless BIV, then I don’t know that I have 
hands”—is true in all contexts, it follows that, in contexts governed by very high standards, the 
conclusion is true.10 That is, in such contexts it is true to say that we don’t know that we’re not 
handless BIVs, and that we don’t know that we have hands. But in other contexts—contexts 
governed by more ordinary standards—the first premise is false. Indeed,  in such contexts it is 
true to say that we do know that we’re not handless BIVs, andthat we have hands.  
 Before moving on to the ways in which DeRose goes beyond the basic contextualist 
solution to BIV, it is worth noting that the basic contextualist solution already does quite a 
good job of explaining the appearance of ignorance. Because ordinary speakers are often 
                                                 
9 DeRose (2009) mounts an extensive defense of this “semantic ignorance” claim. 
10 One of the central claims in Chapter 1 of TAI (which is a reprint of DeRose 1995) is that closure 
holds in all contexts. 
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ignorant of the fact that the word ‘knows’ is context-sensitive, it is no surprise that considering 
arguments like BIV (and more generally arguments of the form AI) can lead them to think they 
know very little, if anything. DeRose’s development of the basic contextualist solution builds 
on this. The central idea of his solution is contained in this passage (from Chapter 1, which is 
a reprint of his 1995 classic, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”): 
 
When it is asserted that some subject S knows (or does not know) some proposition P, the 
standards for knowledge (the standards for how good an epistemic position one must be 
in to count as knowing) tend to be raised, if need be to such a level as to require S’s belief 
in that particular P to be sensitive for it to count as knowledge (p. 27). 
 
DeRose calls this the “rule of sensitivity”. The idea is that, when you assert that S knows (or 
does not know) that p, the standards tend to rise to a level such that S’s belief that p must be 
sensitive, where S’s belief that p is sensitive just in case, if p were false, S wouldn’t believe 
that p. 
 This goes beyond the basic contextualist solution to the skeptical problem in (at least) 
two respects. First, it provides some insight into the mechanism by which considering skeptical 
arguments might lead to an increase in standards, and so generate the appearance of ignorance. 
When the skeptic asserts “You don’t know that you’re not a handless BIV”, this tends to raise 
the standards to a level such that your belief must be sensitive in order to count as knowledge, 
and because your belief is not sensitive—if it were false, you would still believe it—your belief 
does not count as sensitive in this context. 
 Second, it provides more of an explanation of the appearance of ignorance. Some (e.g. 
Nozick) hold that sensitivity is a necessary condition on knowledge. That is, they hold that: 
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SENSITIVITY: S knows that p only if S’s belief is sensitive, where S’s belief that p is 
sensitive iff, if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p. 
 
DeRose holds that sensitivity isn’t a necessary condition on knowledge, but that there is a 
conversational rule to the effect that asserting that someone knows (or does not know) some p 
tends to put into place standards for attributing knowledge such that their belief that p must be 
sensitive in order to count as knowledge. In slogan form: sensitivity is not a necessary condition 
for knowledge, but rather for knowledge attribution. Because of the operation of the rule of 
sensitivity, it is no surprise that we can seem to not know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, 
and so why considering arguments like BIV can lead us to deny we know much if anything. 
 Much more could be said about the details of DeRose’s contextualist semantics. In 
particular, one of the main themes in TAI is that contextualism—or at least DeRose’s version 
of it—is far less “even-handed” than many suppose (see especially Chapter 4). More generally, 
TAI clears up a wide range of misunderstandings, confusions and mistakes that are often made 
in discussions of contextualism in general, and contextualist solutions to skepticism in 
particular. But we already have what we need for my purposes. To recap: DeRose thinks that 
a solution to AI should do two things. First, it should explain how we can know common-or-
garden propositions and the denials of skeptical hypotheses which these propositions entail. 
Second, it should explain how it can seem like we don’t know such things. His substantive 
picture of knowledge carries out the first task; his contextualist semantics for knowledge 
attributions the second. Put together, this seems an effective “proof by example” that 
contextualism is not an “evasion” of epistemology (Kornblith 2000) or irrelevant to 
epistemological (in particular skeptical) concerns (Sosa 2000). I will now turn to critical 
evaluation of DeRose’s package of views.  
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5. Alternative Explanations of the Appearance of Ignorance 
DeRose’s picture of knowledge combines a standard safety account of how we can know 
common-or-garden propositions with a slightly more complex epistemic conservative account 
of how we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses. To epistemologists of a more 
externalist bent, this might look a little like overkill: why do we need to add something “extra” 
to explain how we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses? But let’s set this to one side. 
Perhaps the right response to this is to say that, while there may be a form of cognitive 
achievement that only requires safe belief, there are other forms of cognitive achievement that 
require a little more (see n. 8). What is more important is that DeRose doesn’t think that even 
the combination of the safety account and the epistemic conservative account is sufficient to 
deal with the problem posed by AI. This is because he thinks his contextualist semantics for 
knowledge attributions is required to account for the appearance of ignorance. One can 
challenge this in two ways. The first is by challenging whether one needs his contextualist 
semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance. The second is by challenging whether 
there is much of an appearance to account for in the first place. In this section, I will look at 
the first challenge. In the next, I will look at the second. 
 One odd feature of TAI is that, while it spends a lot of time (especially in Chapter 1) 
arguing that the skeptical “response” to AI (scare-quotes because the response is to just accept 
the argument and its conclusion) is to be rejected, it spends little time arguing that non-
skeptical, non-contextualist responses to AI are inferior to contextualism. This absence is made 
more troubling by the fact that, as we have seen, DeRose combines his contextualist semantics 
with a substantive picture of knowledge. This prompts a question: what, exactly, does the 
contextualist semantics add to the sort of explanation of the appearance of ignorance that can 
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be given by a combination of a standard safety and an epistemic conservative account of 
knowledge? 
 We can start by looking at the resources that the standard safety account and the 
epistemic conservative account have, taken individually, to account for the appearance of 
ignorance. In “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Ernest Sosa argues that, not only does the 
standard safety account have the resources to explain how it is that we know the denials of 
skeptical hypotheses (the first task for a theory of knowledge), it can also explain the 
appearance of ignorance (the second task).11 The basic thought is that, while knowledge 
requires safety rather than sensitivity, it is very easy to confuse safety with sensitivity. It is 
therefore not difficult to see how a skilled skeptic could lead us to deny that we know the denial 
of skeptical hypotheses (or for that matter to deny that we know anything at all) by appealing 
to reasons for thinking that our beliefs are insensitive. It takes skilled philosophical diagnosis 
to reveal that knowledge requires safety, not sensitivity, and so the skeptic’s reasons should be 
rejected.  
 To Sosa’s explanation we can add the following: the standard safety account is an 
externalist account of knowledge, and to the extent that skeptical arguments rely on internalist 
assumptions and/or sympathies (e.g., that there is something lacking from our epistemic 
                                                 
11 I focus on Sosa (1999) here, but one could make similar points about neo-Moorean appeals to the 
pragmatics of knowledge attribution (see Pritchard 2002). To be fair to DeRose, he does respond to 
Sosa in DeRose (2004b), and he deals with pragmatic moves in TCC. But one would expect a book-
length treatment to at least acknowledge this issue, and give some indication of how DeRose thinks it 
can be tackled. And at any rate, my objection below is based not just on the explanatory power of 
standard safety accounts, but on the explanatory power of a combination of the standard safety and the 
epistemic conservative account. 
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position if we lack an awareness of the facts in virtue of which our beliefs are justified/qualify 
as knowledge, or that in order to know/be justified you have to be able to provide reasons in 
support of your belief), it is no surprise that many of us (especially those of us who haven’t 
read the recent epistemological literature) can be brought by skeptical argument to question 
our beliefs. So the externalist seems to have a more general explanation of the appearance of 
ignorance, which the defender of the standard safety account can appeal to. 
 What about the epistemic conservative account? I am not aware of a “standard” 
epistemic conservative explanation of the appearance of ignorance and the “allure” of 
skepticism, but let me venture a suggestion. At the base of the epistemic conservative picture—
at least, as DeRose understands it—is an appeal to what we can call “Reidian common sense.” 
Here’s Thomas Reid articulating what I mean by Reidian common sense: 
 
The sceptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external object which you 
perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of Nature; it 
bears her image and superscription; and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine: I even took 
it upon trust, and without suspicion. Reason, says the sceptic, is the only judge of truth, 
and you ought to throw off every opinion and every belief that is not grounded on reason. 
Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception?—they came 
both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of 
false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another? (Reid 1764: 168–
169) 
 
On this picture, certain beliefs—like the belief that we’re not being constantly deceived by our 
senses—are not supported by reasons, but rather are parts of our nature. The skeptic’s mistake 
is to ask for reasons for them, as if they need to be given.  
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 Perhaps the epistemic conservative is right that such reasons don’t need to be given, 
and so right that the skeptic’s argument should not move us to abandon our most basic beliefs. 
Yet, if DeRose is right, we can be moved to at least consider abandoning them due to skeptical 
argument. (If DeRose doesn’t think we can be moved to at least consider abandoning them due 
to skeptical argument, I don’t know what the appearance of ignorance amounts to.) It would 
seem to me that the Reidian commonsensical picture provides a pretty good explanation why 
we might be drawn to take these arguments seriously, even though we have no reason to: we 
have nothing to pit against them other than our trust that their conclusions are false. Now, it 
may be that we can mount a philosophical defense of the propriety of pitting this trust against 
the skeptic’s arguments. But it would hardly be a surprise if many of us, lacking any awareness 
of that defense, were inclined to go along with the skeptic. So it seems like the epistemic 
conservative account can do a pretty good job of explaining the appearance of ignorance all by 
itself. The appearance of ignorance is generated by the sorts of suspicions about the propriety 
of trusting to “our nature” or “constitution” that philosophical defenses of epistemic 
conservatism are meant to dispel. 
 I take this to at least make it plausible that, taken individually, the defender of the 
standard safety account and the defender of the epistemic conservative account have ample 
resources to explain the appearance of ignorance. If we combine these accounts, as DeRose 
does, we get the power of both these explanations. Indeed, we may get more than that. One can 
see DeRose’s combination of the standard safety account and the epistemic conservative 
account as in part motivated by the felt inadequacy of either account taken in isolation. The 
standard safety account seems to run into trouble when it comes to justifying our most basic 
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beliefs (consider the problems of easy knowledge, and bootstrapping).12 The epistemic 
conservative account seems too weak as an account of knowledge in general: surely knowledge 
requires a little more than the absence of reason to doubt! For someone who hasn’t considered 
the possibility of combining these views, whether because they think they can’t be combined, 
or because they have never considered doing so, it is, again, no surprise that skeptical argument 
might take hold, and the appearance of ignorance be generated. 
 
6. The Disappearance of Ignorance 
So far I have argued that the non-contextualist part of DeRose’s overall picture might be 
enough to explain the appearance of ignorance. In this section, I want to say something about 
the appearance of ignorance itself. In particular, I want to address three issues: 
 
1. How widespread is it? That is, how many people can be brought to doubt whether we 
know anything at all by considering AI? 
2. How robust is it? That is, for those who can be brought to doubt whether we know 
anything at all by considering AI, is this doubt only fleeting, or more permanent? 
3. How rational is it? That is, do those who are brought to doubt whether we know 
anything at all by considering AI brought to do so on the basis of (good) reasons? 
 
As we will see, somewhat surprisingly, DeRose doesn’t think that the appearance of ignorance 
is particularly widespread, robust, or rational. In this section, I will outline why DeRose thinks 
this, and explain why I take this to pose a problem for the central argument of TAI. The 
                                                 
12 These problems have been forcefully articulated by DeRose’s fellow contextualist, Stewart Cohen 
(2002). DeRose seems happy to go along with Cohen on this (see p. 217). 
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problem, in short, is that if the appearance of ignorance isn’t that widespread, robust, or 
rational, why should a solution to AI have to account for it? 
 We can start with DeRose’s take on how widespread the appearance of ignorance is. 
DeRose presents a decidedly mixed picture here. On the one hand, he tells us that, in his 
experience, undergraduates can very easily be led to see the power of AI (pp. 55–56). On the 
other, he reports a study he carried out with Joshua Knobe in which ordinary adults didn’t 
generally find AI particularly persuasive (Appendix B). More generally, DeRose seems willing 
to grant that, for many, AI holds little power at all, whether intuitive or not. But, DeRose tells 
us, this doesn’t matter:  
 
It is important to emphasize … that not only does the value of studying skeptical 
arguments not depend on their being so powerful as to truly constitute “paradoxes,” but 
that these arguments can be well worth studying even if one’s initial reaction to them places 
one toward the extreme Kelly end of the continuum at which one judges them to be in-
advance doomed. For even if an argument were not nearly powerful enough to have any 
hope of establishing its conclusion, if it were nonetheless even a fairly strong argument, it 
would still be a likely source of important information about the argument’s subject 
matter—knowledge, in the case of AI. (p. 62) 
 
The idea seems to be that, to the extent that AI is powerful, that power needs to be explained. 
Turning now to how robust the appearance of ignorance is, DeRose says this about the 
durability of the appeal of AI’s first premise (the premise that says we don’t know the denials 
of skeptical hypotheses), which he takes to be the weak link in the argument: 
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My attempts to ascertain non-philosophers’ assessments of what I take to be AI’s weak 
link have if anything increased the extent to which I thought an account of that premise’s 
appeal was desirable. That there are settings where that appeal seems very strong would 
tend to show that the premise (and then the argument of which it is the weakest link) can 
be very powerful, even if there are other settings where that appeal is quite diminished. 
(And perhaps when it is presented by an actual skeptic, or a teacher doing a good job of 
playing the role of a skeptic, its power is significantly greater still than it is when presented 
by a philosophy professor who is trying to be as neutral as possible about the matter. (p. 
59) 
 
DeRose’s view seems to be that even those who do see the appeal of skeptical arguments only 
see them as appealing in certain settings or contexts. While some of us can be brought to see 
the argument as very powerful in some settings, in others this power is rather more limited. 
 Finally, what is DeRose’s take on the rationality of going along with the skeptical 
argument? Throughout TAI (and especially in Chapter 4) DeRose goes to great lengths to 
dispel the common idea that contextualists propose an “even-handed” solution to the skeptical 
problem according to which both the skeptic and the anti-skeptic are right “in their own 
context.” While many interpret the contextualist in this way, DeRose’s considered view is that, 
while the skeptic makes conversational moves intended to put very high standards into place, 
standards such that all (or almost all) of our beliefs fail to meet them—perhaps by exploiting 
DeRose’s rule of sensitivity—there is no need for anyone to go along with this. Skeptics may 
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try to raise the standards, but we can—and maybe should—resist.13 This rejection of “even-
handedness” presumably goes with a denial that there is any reason to go along with the skeptic 
who wants to raise the standards, if not the view that it would be positively irrational to go 
along with the skeptic. 
 Putting all this together, DeRose holds the appearance of ignorance isn’t that 
widespread, robust, or rational. Somewhat surprisingly, he doesn’t seem to see this as a 
problem: 
 
The conviction that there’s bound to be something important to learn about knowledge 
from a puzzle as sharp as is the one presented by AI need not be driven by an opinion that 
there is some deeply important (and perhaps menacing) skeptical truth somehow standing 
behind the skeptic’s position. The lessons to be learned may instead have to do with what 
knowledge is, and how knowledge claims work, in such a way as to dodge menacing forms 
of skepticism. (p. 98) 
 
Let’s grant DeRose that, even if AI were not generally regarded as particularly powerful—as 
having widespread, robust, or rational acceptance—and as not revealing some important truth 
behind skepticism, it might still be a source of information about knowledge and knowledge 
claims. But this seems to fall a long way short of justifying the claim that a central task for a 
solution to AI is to explain the appearance of ignorance. You can learn something important 
about knowledge (and maybe knowledge attribution) by reflecting on the shortcomings of all 
                                                 
13 While DeRose discusses this issue in TAI, what he says is essentially a reiteration of points made in 
Chapter 4 of TCC, which is itself a reprint of DeRose (2004a). One can understand his frustration that 
his position is still so regularly misinterpreted! 
21 
 
sorts of arguments for views in epistemology that fail to establish their conclusions. Take, for 
instance, arguments to the effect that knowledge doesn’t require belief (Radford 1966), or that 
knowledge just requires true belief (Sartwell 1992), or that knowledge (or “knowledge”) isn’t 
factive (Kusch 2002, Hazlett 2010). It is unclear why there need be any requirement to explain 
away any lingering misleading impressions that these conclusions are true. This makes the task 
for non-contextualist anti-skeptics all the easier. Maybe it is enough to have an explanation of 
how it is that we know so much without also having much of an explanation of how it is that 
we can seem to not know anything at all. Maybe we can seem to not know anything at all for 
much the same reason that it can seem that knowledge doesn’t require belief, or only requires 
true belief, or that knowledge isn’t factive. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
DeRose’s central argument in TAI is that there are two things that a solution to the skeptical 
problem must accomplish. First, it must explain how we can resist AI’s skeptical conclusion: 
how is it that we can know common-or-garden propositions? Second, it must explain the 
appearance of ignorance: how is it that it can seem that we don’t know common-or-garden 
propositions, or indeed anything at all? I have argued that one part of DeRose’s solution—his 
substantive picture of knowledge—threatens to render the other part—his contextualist 
semantics for knowledge attributions—explanatorily redundant. We can explain any 
appearance of ignorance via the picture of knowledge, without recourse to contextualism. 
Further, the appearance of ignorance is—as DeRose seems to freely admit—not necessarily 
that widespread, not necessarily that robust, and not particularly rational (and perhaps 
downright irrational). I have also argued that this makes trouble for DeRose’s central argument 
for contextualism. If the appearance of ignorance is not widespread, robust, or rational, it is 
unclear the fact (if it is a fact) that contextualism can explain it does much to advance the case 
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for contextualism. This conclusion might sound a little like the complaint that 
contextualism is irrelevant to epistemology that I have said DeRose rightly rejects. But it is 
importantly different. My claim is not that contextualism is in principle irrelevant to 
epistemology, but rather that it is unclear what it adds to DeRose’s solution to the skeptical 
problem, once his substantive picture of knowledge is on the table. So the complaint is not that 
DeRose is doing philosophy of language rather than epistemology. Rather, the complaint is 
that he does so much epistemology his philosophy of language might look a little redundant.  
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